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This paper investigates how business groups in Thailand had evolved since the 1950s. We 
argue that political connections and foreign capital among other factors were contributable to the 
emerging of Thai business groups. The business groups that owned banks developed fast during 
the late 1980s and the early 1990s until the financial deregulation, and the establishment of  the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand, and the Bangkok International Banking Facilities.  After that the 
groups that do not own banks have expanded rapidly.  We find that the ownership and board 
structure of the listed firms that belong to the top 30 business groups were not affected by the crisis. 
Compared to the pre-crisis period, the leverage ratio for the business groups firms has increased 
while the profitability has declined during the post crisis of 1997-1999. Restructuring appears to 
work well among group firms since it has helped improved industry-adjusted operating 
performance of the firms. 
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1. Introduction 
  Modern capitalization in Thailand began around the beginning of the 20
th century. Those 
who played the major role were either immigrant Chinese or local-born Chinese. In this paper, we 
investigate how these families have developed to be diversified and later on became business 
groups.  As argued by many scholars in the business group literature, market imperfections, 
political economy, and cultural heritage could be among the important factors that contributed to 
the group foundation in Thailand in the similar manner as business groups in many emerging 
economies (Granovetter (1994), Ghemawat and Khanna (1998), Khanna and Palepu (2000), and 
Khanna (2000)). Our analysis, however,  is  based on the political economy approach which 
emphasize on the close connections between businessmen and politicians as well as bureaucrats 
(Hamilton et al. (1990)).   
We also investigate the characteristics of  firms affiliated with the top 30 business groups 
regarding ownership and control structures as well as financial characteristics, based on our unique 
and comprehensive database. Our focus  is  non-financial  firms listed  in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand during the period between 1995 and 2000. Our sample coverage cannot go beyond listed 
firms simply because data of non-listed firms and data for the earlier period are not available. This 
sample period enables us to examine how business groups have been affected by the 1997 East 
Asian financial crisis, and how they have responded to the crisis. We provide some background in 
restructuring initiatives by the government under the International Monetary Fund’s program. 
Following the  literature on corporate restructuring and financial distress,  we  then present 
operational and financial restructuring actions undertaken by business group firms.   
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the origin and evolution of 
business groups. Section 3 i llustrates the  impact of the East Asian financial crisis on  business 
groups and presents governance and financial characteristics of listed firms that are affiliated with 
the top 30 business groups in the  period before and after the crisis. Section  4  describes 
restructuring schemes introduced by the government and  investigates restructuring activities 
undertaken by business group firms as well as the efficiency of such activities in response to the 
crisis. We also present a number of case studies of restructuring activities taken by some leading 
Thai business groups in this section. Finally, Section 5 provides a summary and conclusion. 
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2. The Emerging of Business Groups 
Until 1932, Thailand was under the absolute monarchy when in all commercial transactions 
were in the hands of the king, royal family members, and nobles of high ranks who had absolute 
controlled over the country. Because of Chinese merchants’ skills and experiences in trading, the 
Crowns promoted Chinese immigration. During 1820 – 1870, the Chinese were given a number of 
privileges, patronized with trading licenses, tax farms, and investment loans and provided political 
support (Phongpaichit and Baker (1995)). Under the patronage of the noblemen, these Chinese 
merchants became successful in doing their own businesses, in particular the rice trading which 
was the most important business accounting for about 70% of all exports in the 1910s 
(Piriyarangsan (1983) and Phongpaichit and Baker (1995)). In 1930s, the rice trade was dominated 
by the “Big Five” families, Bulakul, Bulasuk, Iamsuri, Lamsam, and Wang Lee who have been 
among the top business groups until the present.   
After the 1932 Revolution  when  the absolute monarchy  was overthrown,  civil service 
officers and armed forces played important roles in  shaping Thai economy. In this section, we 
describe how the new rulers exercised their power in terms of capitalization, and how Chinese 
entrepreneurs built up connections with them and established business networks. 
 
2.1 The Political Background during 1932-1973   
2.1.1 The People’s Party Regime 
During 1932  until 1947, the People’s Party was the new ruler. Political  and economic 
power was transferred from the king and noblemen to civil service and military  officers.  The 
development regime led was regarded as the nationalistic development approach under the slogan 
“Thailand is for the Thais. Under this regime, the government aimed to promote Thai nationals 
into business participation and decrease the role of Chinese migrants who dominated important 
industries. In fact, by this time the  Big Five Chinese rice trading families had expanded their 
business  networks  to cover various businesses to assist their rice trading. These businesses 
included rice  milling, warehouses,  shipping, banking, insurance, and foreign exchange dealing 
(Phongpaichit and Baker (1995)).   
The nationalistic policy was pursued  via promulgating regulations restricting Chinese 
immigrants from doing business, and promoting investments by the Thais. Although the 
government implemented various schemes to help the Thais become entrepreneurs, it did not seem   3 
to work. At that time, it was not necessary for the Thais to become traders or business owners since 
they could easily live on the country’s plentiful natural resources. On the other hand, it was 
prestigious and secured if the Thais served the government (Phipatseritham and Yoshihara (1983)). 
To encounter the Chinese dominance, the government was involved in doing business directly by 
setting up many state-owned enterprises and semi-governmental companies. These c ompanies 
were mainly in trading (e.g., the Thai Rice, Ltd., Thai Produce Trading Co. Ltd., the Thai Fisheries, 
Co., Ltd., etc.) and financial industries (e.g., the Bank of Asia for Industry and Commerce, the 
Provincial Bank Ltd., and the Thai Sreshthakich Insurance Co. Ltd.).  The semi-governmental 
companies were jointly owned by the government and the private sector. The private sector here 
usually comprised the members of the People’s Party, the government officials, and the Chinese 
businessmen who had close relationship with the  members of the People’s Party such as  the 
Bulakul family, the Lamsam family, and the Wang Lee family. The members of the People’s Party 
and their close associates (including the Chinese traders) also utilized their power to set up private 
companies (Piriyarangsan  (1983) and Phongpaichit and Baker (1995)). So, it turns out that even 
though the government’s policy aimed to eradicate the economic power of the small and medium 
Chinese traders, they collaborated with the big Chinese merchants. 
 
2.1.2 The Military Regime 
In 1947, a group of armed forces led by Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsongkram, Lt. Gen. Pin 
Chunnahawan, Col. Pao Sriyanond, and Field Marshal Sarit Thanarajata, took over power from the 
People’s Party.  Until the 1973 Revolution, the military  had been in charge of controlling and 
developing Thai economy. The military in power did not renounce the “state capitalism” policy 
established by the People’s Party. In addition, they  were more likely to establish their private 
companies and protecting their affiliated business, relative to members of the People’s Party. There 
were two important groups in the coup due to the conflict of interests among them. The first group 
was the Soi Rajakru led by Pin Chunnahawan and Pao Sriyanond. The second group was the Sisao 
Deves led by Sarit Thanarajata. After Sarit Thanarajata seized power from Plaek Pibulsongkram in 
1957, the Sisao Deves group solely controlled Thai economy and were able to exploit private 
benefits of control (Piriyarangsan (1983)). 
Under the military regime, m ajor profitable industries, namely sugar refining, tobacco, 
paper and plywood, and brewing were monopolized by the state. Consequently, about 56 state   4 
enterprises were set up during 1947-1956 in the key industries. In addition, the government formed 
a large number of joint venture companies with the business leading Sino-Thais. In the financial 
industry, the government had the ownership and directorship in all the 13 commercial banks 
(Suehiro (1989)). 
It is thought, however, that the real objective behind the government’s involvement in 
doing business was to generate the funding to finance both personal and political activities of the 
military figures who were in control (Piriyarangsan (1983), Riggs (1966), and Hewison (1985 and 
2001)). This objective became clear after 1951 when the powerful military figures and bureaucrats 
in control no longer hid the interests. The military group leaders turned out to be extremely 
wealthy afterwards. These military leaders were namely Sarit Thanarajata (who led the autocratic 
government in 1958-1963),  Thanom Kitikachorn  (who led the  autocratic government in 
1963-1973),  Prapas Charusathiarana, and Krit Sivara, from the Sisao Deves clique, and  Phin 
Chunhawan,  Pao Sriyanon,  Praman Adireksan (son-in-law of Phin Chunhawan),  and  Siri 
Siriyothin, the Soi Rajakru clique. Their business was extended into various industries including 
banking, trading, mining, manufacturing, construction, and services ( Meechai (1983),  Suehiro 
(1989), and Sonsuphap (1996)).   
In general, as the military government was strong and could intervene in any areas of life 
during the period 1947-1973, the business environment turned out to be uncertain (Hewison (1985 
and 2001)). There was a fear that potential business might be taken over by the government or was 
abolished if it was against the interests of the important members of the military hierarchy 
(Hewison (1985) and Suehiro (1989)). For example, the big rice trading families, the Bulsuk, 
Lamsam, and Wanglee, were suppressed when Predi Pranomyong with whom they had close ties 
lost the control to the Soi Rajakhru group in 1947.   
 
2.2 The Formation of Political Connections 
In order to operate in the business environment described in Section 2.1, it is necessary to 
establish close ties with the rulers in particular the military leaders. Suehiro (1989) goes so far as 
to suggest that “no leading Chinese capitalist could survive or expand their business without 
alliances with the Thai ruling elites.” For example, Chin Sophonpanich, the founder of the 
Bangkok Bank group, had a good connection with Pao Sriyanond, the leader of the Soi Rajakru 
group. The Lamsam family of the Thai Farmers Bank group had Chulin Lamsam being responsible   5 
for establishing relationships with  Plaek Pibulsongkram and  the Sisao Deves  group. Also, 
Ratanarak  family  of  the Bank of Ayudhya group was closely associated with Prapas 
Charusathiarana of the the Sisao Deves  group (Phipatseritham and Yoshihara (1983), Suehiro 
(1989), and Bualek (2000)).   
There were mutual interests between the Sino-Thai businessmen and the government. The 
Sino-Thai businessmen provided the government ruling class not only capital but also 
entrepreneurial and managerial expertise of which the government figures lacked. For example, a 
member of the Bulakul family, that was one of the biggest rice traders at that time, served as the 
managing director of a state-owned company, the Thai Rice Corporation which monopolized the 
rice export business (Suehiro (1989)).  The  Lamsam  family  had Chulin Lamsam serving as an 
executive director of a stated owned company, Thai Niyom Panich. The financial benefits were 
also given to the ruling class in the forms of a company’s shares and directorship. For example, 
Lamsam family provided a directorship to Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn.   
In return, the Sino-Thai businessmen obtained security that they were not intervened or 
politically harassed (Suehiro (1989) and Hewison (1989)). Additionally, they were granted 
monopolistic rights, quotas, licenses, lucrative contracts, capital, foreign loans using the 
government as a guarantor, and other privileges ahead of competitors who lacked of the 
connections (Hewison (1985, 1989, and 2001) and Suehiro (1989)). The relationship worked well 
as there were mutual interests. 
However, the connections work both ways. When the connected politicians were no longer 
in control, their related parties got hurt. For example, when Plaek Phibunsongkram lost the control 
to Sarit Thanarajata in 1957,  the Bangkok B ank group  slowed down as it was not as well 
connected to the new political leaders as the Lamsam group was. Piriyarangsan (1983) points out 
that the Chinese merchants would be under the patronage of any political group that was in power.   
 
2.3 Political Connections and the Emergence of Business Groups during the 1950s 
By early  the 1950s, at least about most of the business groups that exist at present had 
emerged. As noted earlier, the big three rice trading families, the Bulasuk, Lamsam, and Wanglee 
emerged in the 1930s. Chinese businessmen who started their business around the late 1940s to 
1950s and later developed their business to become business groups were namely  Chin 
Sophonpanich, Uthane Techaphaibun,  Sukree Pothiratanagkun, Thiem Chokwatana, Kiarti   6 
Srifuengfung, Wit Viriyaprapaikit, Tiang Chirathiwat, Suri Asadathorn and Kwang Soon Lee (see 
Phongpaichit and Baker (1995)). In the 1940s until the early 1950s, four banks were set up: the 
Bangkok Bank, the Metropolitan Bank, the Ayudhya Bank and the Union Bank. The founders of 
each bank were a group of Chinese from a single dialect group. Interesting, the founders of the 
former three banks were the Teochiu dialect Chinese.   
We argue that besides being skillful, the Chinese businessmen that had strong relationships 
with the government body  were able to expand their business.  The  Bangkok Bank group is 
probably one of the most notable cases, and hence can be used to support this argument. Chin 
Sophonpanich was very keen on establishing and employing political networks to expand his 
empire of the Bangkok Bank group that has become the largest business group in Thailand for the 
next three decades (see Hewison (1985 and 2001), Suehiro (1989), and Bualek (2000)). This is in 
addition to his excellent entrepreneur skills, however. During the beginning of the 1950s, using the 
connection with important state figures, Chin managed to not only rescue the financial distressed 
Bangkok Bank, but also develop the bank to be the largest bank in Thailand. To establish political 
connections, Chin appointed members of the Soi Rajkhru  group who were powerful and were 
among the state influential officers during 1951-1957.  They were namely Siri Siriyothin and 
Praman Adireksarn who served as the Chairman and Executive Directors of  Bangkok Bank, 
respectively. Siri Siriyothin did a great favor to the bank by convincing the government to bail it 
out by injecting Baht 30 million to buy the bank’s shares. Note that the bank’s capital was only 
Baht 20 million. As a result, the bank became the largest bank in terms of capital in 1953. It was 
by far larger than the second largest bank at that time, Bank of Ayudhya, whose capital was Baht 
30 million. More importantly, by being a state owned bank, the Bangkok Bank was able to obtain 
various transactions from state owned enterprises including deposit and loans. Since then the 
Bangkok Bank has been the cornerstone of the Sophonpanich group (Suehiro (1989), Hawison 
(1989), and Bualek (2000)). 
When the Soi Rajkhru group lost the control to the Sisao Deves group in 1957, Chin had to 
leave Thailand, and apparently went to Hong Kong. However, soon after the situation got better, 
Chin re-established a similar pattern of political connections. Sarit, the leader of the Sisao Deves 
group was appointed as an advisor of the bank’s board of directors. Another powerful military 
officer, Prapas Charusathiarana was also nominated as the Chairman to replace Siri Siriyothin of 
the Soi Rajkhru group. Prapas held the position until he was thrown out in 1973.   7 
 
2.4 The Development during 1960s until the mid of 1990s: The Role of Connections and 
Foreign Capital 
Even after the implementation of the first National Economic Development Plan by Sarit 
Thanarajata in 1961, close connections with the government have continued to be essential in 
order to win the governmental contracts and financial support.
1 Industrial promotion policies were 
implemented, beginning with import substitution policies in 1961 and  later being replaced by 
export promotion policies in 1972. The Board of Investment (BOI) was established to promote 
investment. It has provided various investment incentives and privileges as well as tax exemptions 
to eligible companies based on production capacity. Because of this requirement, only large 
companies could enjoy the privileges. Partly because the investment project evaluation process 
often had not been transparent, the privileges apparently went to many well connected families 
including the existing business groups.   
Moreover, big business groups seemed to be able to obtain preferential funding from a state 
owned bank, the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand (IFCT). The IFCT was established in 
1959 as a part of the industrial policies. The aim was originally to provide medium and long term 
credit to industrial companies. Apparently, family members from the big business groups that 
owned banks served as the directors of the IFCT. These families include Sophonpanich family (the 
Bangkok Bank Group), Lamsam family (the Thai Farmers Bank Group), Cholvijarn  family (the 
Union Bank Group), and Boonsung  family (the Laemthong Bank Group). Hewison (1985) thus 
concludes that it was likely that the IFCT had provided preferential loans to the owners of these 
business groups.   
As a result of the industrial promotion policies, the business of many of the well connected 
families grew rapidly. These families expanded and emerged as new business groups. Some of the 
                                                 
1  The Plan was supervised by the National Economic Development Board, of which the Chairman 
was the Prime Minister. At that time, economic development was predominant and extensively 
accepted, as influenced by the country’s major development economists. The Plan’s single goal 
was to accelerate the economic growth. It was a top-down and centralized planning. The key 
strategies  were increasing investments in basic infrastructure by public sector and promoting 
industrial investments by private sector. The Plan also focused on accumulation of physical capital 
assets. Until 1972, the national plan had also involved social development process. Since then, the 
plan was called the National Economic and Social Development Plan (Source: Office of the 
National Economic and Social Development Board).   
   8 
groups that were  founded earlier have transformed to become industrial groups. For example, 
those who focused on the agriculture industry and trading (wholesalers, importers and exporters) 
shifted their investment to the manufacturing industry (Suehiro (1989)). These families are, for 
example, the Phornprapha group and the CP group. The Phornprapha group which was a used cars 
and new trucks distributor and importer established car manufacturers. The CP group, founded by 
Chiarawanon family, which engaged in importing feed and fertilizer during the 1950s set up a feed 
miller, the Bangkok Feedmill Company, in 1968.   
Since the 1960s, the emerging business groups have expanded their connections with state 
apparatus by recruiting former managers and retired high-ranking officers of state-owned 
companies (e.g., the Bank of Thailand). The benefits from such recruitment were thought of being 
used to establish connections with the senior bureaucrats at that time.   
Until the first half of 1980s, the business was dominated by the big five financial business 
groups. They managed to grow probably because they owned banks and finance companies and 
hence were less financial constrained. Also, all the Chinese businessmen who founded the groups 
had close ties with the government.  These groups are the Bangkok Bank group (Sophonpanich 
family), the Siam Commercial Bank group (the Crown Property Bureau), the Thai Farmers Bank 
group (Lamsam family), the Bangkok Metropolitan Bank group (Taechaphaibun family), and the 
Bank of Ayudya group (Ratanarak family). According to the survey by Suehiro (1989), these five 
groups had about 281 affiliated firms in the beginning of the 1980s.   
Among the big five, the Bangkok Bank group was the biggest. By the beginning of the 
1980s, it has been diversified beyond the financial industry to various industries including the 
textile, food and beverage, trading, shipping, paper, and real estate industries. The Bangkok Bank 
group owned 83 domestic affiliations and 38 affiliations oversea. Likewise, the Thai Farmers Bank 
group and the Bangkok Metropolitan Bank group had 72 and 77 affiliated companies, respectively 
(Suehiro (1989)).   
Similar to many emerging economies, the expanding of Thai business empires is also 
contributable to foreign capital and technology (Suehiro (1989)). The huge inflow of foreign 
capital and technology since the 1960s with the peak in the 1980s did not only relax the constraints 
of smaller business groups that did not own financial institutions but also provided technology of 
which they lacked. For example, the CP group managed to establish its vertically integrated 
production system in the broiler chicken industry in 1970-71 by forming a joint venture with Arbor   9 
Acres Corporation, one of the leading three companies in the breeding industry in the world at that 
time (Hewison (1989) and (Suehiro (1989)). The success of the Siam Motors group was another 
example. After forming joint ventures with the Japanese leading automobile companies namely 
Nissan Motor and Yamaha Motor, the Siam Motors group grew rapidly. There were 21 joint 
venture companies affiliated to this group in 1981 (Suehiro (1989)).  The investment pattern 
changed in the 1980s when many joint ventures were formed between local firms and Japanese 
firms to assemble goods not to local markets but to export. The investment was concentrated in 
labor-intensive industries namely the textile, automobile, and electronic industries. 
Financial deregulations and the development of the Stock Exchange of Thailand during the 
late 1980s, as well as the establishment of the Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBF) in 
the early 1990s, provided alternative sources of fund that reduced the reliance of domestic banks 
for lending. Accordingly, business groups that did not own banks have become less financial 
constrained and been able to expand rapidly since then. Until the financial crisis in 1997, while 
bank-dominated business groups have become less important, business groups in communications, 
media, electronics, manufacturing, and real estate have been growing (Hewison (2000)). Table 1 
shows evidence supporting this argument. Panel A of this table presents the ranking of the top 30 
business groups during the 1970s-90s
2. Panel B focuses on the top 30 business groups in 1994. It 
presents the industries in which these groups have operated and the number of affiliated companies 
in the groups
3.     
Panel A reveals that even though the big three bank-dominated groups, namely the Siam 
Cement (Siam Commercial Bank) group, the Bangkok Bank group, and the Thai Farmers Bank 
group, have remained in the top five business groups since 1980s, other bank-dominated groups 
have been declining. Panel B suggests a high degree of diversification of top business group in 
Thailand, which is measured by their business lines and the number of firms belonging to the 
groups. Similar to business groups in many emerging economies, the business structure of Thai 
business groups is extensively diversified (see Chang (2003)). For example, the largest group, the 
Siam Cement (Siam Commercial Bank) group, which belongs to the Crown Property Bureau, was 
                                                 
2  As far as we know, there is no statistics of business groups in Thailand before 1979. 
Pipattseritham (1981) and Suehiro (1989) are the first studies. 
3 This ranking  was based on sales and done by Suehiro (2000). Note that this ranking includes 
only firms that appeared among the top 1000 companies in 1994 published by Advance Research 
Group (1995). Therefore, it may not include all the groups’ affiliated firms.   10 
involved in a number of industries including manufacturing, banking, finance and insurance, hotels, 
real estate development and construction, and media/communication/advertising. The CP group, 
which was the third largest group and originally focused on the agro-industry, had diversified to 
other industries including chemicals, international trading; marketing and services, real estate and 
property development, petrochemicals and telecommunications/mass media. Besides operating in a 
number of industries, the top business groups had a number of affiliations. On average, the top five 
business groups owned 51.2 companies. The top 30 business groups owned 46.83 firms. Among 
them, the  Sahapattanapibul group had the highest number of companies with 194 affiliated 
companies. 
 
<Table 1 here> 
 
3. The Business Groups in Thailand 
First, we present the general picture to show the characteristics of firms affiliated to the top 
30 business groups. We briefly discuss the causes of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis focusing 
on  Thailand. We explore the effects of the crisis on the top 30 business groups with respect to 
ownership and control structures, as well as financial characteristics. Because of the data 
unavailability, our investigation cannot go beyond listed companies. Also, our focus here is only 
non financial firms.   
 
3.1 The Characteristics of Business Groups 
Panel A of Table 2 shows the number of  (non financial)  firms affiliating to the top 30 
business groups that were listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand during the period 1995-2000. A 
firm is classified as an affiliation of a business group if its largest shareholder is the group’s 
founding family. Compared to the chaebols in Korea, it is less common for Thai business groups to 
have their affiliated firms listed in the Stock Exchange. On average the top five business groups 
had eight listed companies, while the top 30 business groups had 3.27 listed companies. Even the 
group that has a large number of companies,  the  Sahapattanapibul group, had only 10 listed 
companies during 1996-97. There are also groups that do not list their companies. Among the top 
30 groups, five groups did not have a single listed company.     11 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the percentage of the firms’ market capitalization over the total 
market capitalization. Even with an exclusion of banks and financial affiliated companies, listed 
firms belonging to the top 30 business groups are relatively large. Before the 1997 crisis,  the 
market capitalization of the business group firms accounts for 29.82% and 25.67% of the total 
market capitalization in 1995 and 1996, respectively. However, in 1997, the share of group firms in 
the stock exchange has fallen to 22.95% of the total market capitalization. In the later years, the 
market capitalization of the 30 business groups has increased to 26.71%, 31.05%, and 28.21% of 
total market capitalization in 1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively. 
 
<Table 2 here> 
 
3.1.1 The Ownership and Governance Structures 
To investigate ownership and control structures, we construct a comprehensive ownership 
database of non-financial companies during 1995-2000. Our ownership database includes detail 
information on shareholders with shareholding at least 0.5% of a firm’s shares
4. The major source 
of ownership and board data is taken from the I-SIMS database produced by the Stock Exchange 
of Thailand. These ownership data as well as the board data are obtained mainly from the I-SIMS 
database produced by the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
Additional information on corporate ownership and board data, including a list of the 
firm’s affiliated companies and shareholdings owned by these companies as well as relationships 
among major shareholders and board members, was manually collected from company files (FM 
56-1) available at the library and the website of the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The financial 
data is also obtained from this source. 
Here we treat all  the members of a family as a single shareholder. We define the family 
relationship as those with the same surnames as well as those who are linked to the family by 
marriage. We traced the marriage relationship using various documents that provide a genealogical 
diagram of  the top business group families.  They are namely Pornkulwat ( 1996), Sappaiboon 
(2000a, 2000b,  and  2001) and  Johnstone et al. ( 2001).  The related  families via marriage are 
summarized  in  Table  3. This information indicates that the relationship via marriage might 
                                                 
4 Previous research (for example, Claessens et al. (2000), Lemmon and Lins (2003), Lins (2003), 
and Mitton (2002)) uses the ownership databases that include shareholders with at least 5% of 
shareholdings.   12 
intensify their business relationship. In fact, this relationship appears to combine businesses of 
these connected families together (Pipattseritham,(1981), Suehiro (1989), and Sappaiboon (2000a, 
2000b, and 2001))   
In addition, we also used the BOL database provided by BusinessOnLine Ltd. to trace the 
ultimate owner of private companies that appear as corporate shareholders of the sample firms. 
The BOL has  a license from  the  Ministry of Commerce of Thailand to reproduce company 
information from the Ministry’s database. This database contains major information on all 
registered companies in Thailand that is reported annually to the Ministry.  Accordingly,  the 
ultimate owners of all privately owned  companies that  appear to be  (domestic corporate) 
shareholders of listed firms in the sample are sought. Failure to search for the owners of these 
private companies would result in the underestimation of equity stake h eld by a firm’s 
shareholders (see Khanthavit, Polsiri, Wiwattanakantang (2003)). 
   
<Table 3 here> 
 
Table 4 presents summary statistics of a number of ownership and other governance 
variables for group and non group firms. The ownership of both group and no group firms is very 
concentrated in the hands of the largest shareholder’s family. In group firms, the average voting 
rights held by the largest shareholder are 42.90%, 44.1%, and 46.28% in 1995, 1996, and 1997, 
respectively. The average cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder are 35.34%, 37.44%, and 
38.65% in 1995, 1996, and 1997, respectively. When compared with non group firms, while the 
voting rights held by group firms are higher, the cash flow rights held by group firms are lower. 
The differences in both the mean and median values are not always statistically significant, 
however.   
We investigate the control structure that is used by the largest shareholder to control the 
firms. Following the literature, we consider three  control  mechanisms:  pyramids, cross- 
shareholdings, and direct shareholdings. We define pyramid and cross- shareholdings in a similar 
manner as La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2001). Specifically, pyramidal and 
cross-shareholding structures require that at least one public company appears along the chain of 
control. In effect, it causes a disparity between cash-flow rights and voting rights.   
The control structure of the business group firms is often via pyramids and   13 
cross-shareholdings, apart from direct shareholdings. Approximately 52%, 54%, and 56% of the 
business group firms use pyramidal shareholdings in 1995, 1996, and 1997, respectively. 
Cross-shareholdings are used much less often only in about 18%, 16%, and 17% in 1995, 1996, 
and 1997, respectively. When compared with non group firms, firms affiliated with the business 
groups appear to employ the complicated ownership structures of pyramid and cross-shareholdings 
more frequently. The differences are statistically significant at the 1 % level for all years. 
Accordingly, the deviation of control from ownership, which is measured by the ratio of the cash 
flow rights to voting rights, is larger in group firms. 
To illustrate how the control pattern is set up, we present the ownership structure of 
International Cosmetics in 1996. Figure 1 is taken from Wiwattanakantang (2000). The pattern of 
shareholding of International Cosmetics illustrates all the types of the controlling mechanisms 
defined in this study, namely direct holdings, and indirect holdings via pyramidal and 
cross-shareholdings. International Cosmetics belongs to the Sahapathanapibul group whose 
founder is Chokwattana family. Chokwattana family directly owns only 0.96% of International 
Cosmetics directly. However, Chokwattana family controls another 20.08% of the voting rights 
indirectly via the group’s privately held holding companies. In addition, Chokwattana family also 
controls International Cosmetics by pyramidal shareholdings via another three listed companies 
Sahapathana Inter-Holdings, and Saha-Pathanapibul and Thai Wacoal (WACOAL) that are 
controlled by Chokwattana family. There is an incidence of cross-shareholdings as International 
Cosmetics also holds 5.03% of Sahapathana Inter-Holdings. In total, Chokwattana family holds 
48.58% of the voting rights of International Cosmetics.   
Table 4 also shows that it is not uncommon for the largest shareholder to be involved in the 
top management. Here, a top management is a person who holds one of the following positions: 
honorary chairman, chairman, executive chairman, vice chairman, president, vice president, chief 
executive officer, managing director, deputy managing director, and assistant managing director. 
Specifically, in about 37%, 33% and 35% of the business group firms, at least one person from the 
largest shareholder’s family serves as top management in 1995, 1996, and 1997, respectively. Non 
group firms also appear to have a similar pattern. 
In addition, we find that the largest shareholder also sits in the board of directors. For group 
firms, on average there are 3.25, 3.32, and 3.18 persons who are from the largest shareholder’s 
family serving as the board members in 1995, 1996, and 1997, respectively. The median numbers   14 
of persons are 3 for all the years. Compared with non group firms, the board domination by the 
controlling family appears significantly more often than group firms. 
Considering board size, business group firms appear to have significantly larger board than 
non group firms. Business group firms have, on average, 13.60, 13.76, and 13.58 members on the 
board in 1995, 1996, and 1997, respectively. The median values are 13 for all the years. The 
median numbers of board members among non group firms are 10 during the period 1995-1997.   
Overall, the results suggest that the ownership of the business group firms is concentrated 
in the hands of the founding family. Similar to the chaebols, Thai business groups consist of 
legally independent companies that are affiliated to a common group name. These firms are 
centrally controlled through direct ownership, pyramidal shareholdings, and cross-shareholdings 
among member firms (see Pipattseritham (1984) and Suehiro (1989)). It is also common that the 
decision making and monitoring are made by family members of the group owners.   
 
 
<Table 4 here> 
<Figure 1 here> 
 
3.1.2 Financial Characteristics 
The severity of the impact of the 1997 East Asian crisis on the business groups is reflected 
in financial characteristics of the group firms. Our focus is in particular the capital structure since 
it is often argued in the literature that a high debt ratio caused Thai firms to be vulnerable to the 
crisis. Table  5 shows financial characteristics, financing structure, and performance of 
non-financial listed companies that are affiliated with the top 30 business group and those that are 
not.   
Regarding firm size, business group firms are significantly larger than non group firms in 
terms of total assets in all periods. For example, in 1996 while the mean value of total assets of 
business group firms is Baht 16,121.83 million, the mean value of total assets of non business 
group firms is Baht 5,906.70 million, which is only about one-third of that of business group firms.   
In the pre-crisis period, the average ratio of total debt to total asset of the top 30 business group 
firms is 36% and 40% in 1995 and 1996, respectively. The average ratio of total debt to total 
capital is 39% and 50% in 1995 and 1996, respectively. However, there is no significant difference   15 
in financing structure between group and non group firms. The debt level of Thai group firms is 
much lower when compared with that of chaebols. As shown by Chang (2003), the average debt to 
equity ratio of the top 30 chaebols is 600%. It should be noted, however, that the debt ratio here is 
that of listed companies.   
On the other hand, after the crisis hit followed by the depreciation of the Baht in July 1997, 
the debt ratio went up for both business group and non group firms. For business group firms, the 
average debt to asset ratio increases from 40% in 1996 to 54% by the end of 1997. The average 
ratio of total debt to total capital increases from 50% in 1996 to 66% in 1997.   
Furthermore, the profits of business group firms have decreased significantly. The average 
ratio of EBIT to total assets declines from 11.65% in 1996 to 2.94% in 1997. After deducting for 
interest expenses, on average business group firms have been in red since the crisis. This situation 
has continued until 2000. Specifically, the mean ratio of EBIT to total assets has decreased from 
8.05% in 1996 to -1.56% in 1997, -3.17% in 1998, -5.49% in 1999. The profit increases in 2000 to 
-2.1%, but still the business group firms, on average, have not been profitable by the end of the 
1990s.   
 
<Table 5 here> 
 
4. The East Asian Financial Crisis and Thailand   
To date, there are extensive studies addressing the causes of the 1997 East Asian financial 
crisis (e.g., International Monetary Fund, Krugman (1997), Corsetti, Pernti, and Roubini (1998), 
Radelet and Sachs (1998), Department of Foreign  Affairs (2000), and Siamwalla (2001)). It is 
generally  believed that hasty financial liberalization without establishing a comprehensive 
regulatory and supervisory framework, macroeconomic mismanagement by the government, large 
foreign short term debt, and  inadequate corporate governance and prudential regulations in the 
private sector were factors underlying the problems of the Thai economy. Financial liberalization 
during the end of the 1980s until the beginning of the 1990s is often regarded as one of the major 
causes of the crisis. In particular, the BIBF that was set up in 1993 to serve as an intermediary 
between overseas lenders and local borrowers turned out to facilitate foreign dominated loans for 
both financial and non financial companies. Most of the loans were not hedged from the lenders’ 
expectations of continued exchange rate stability.   16 
The growing mismatch in the currency denomination of banks’ assets and liabilities was 
thought as one of the major causes of the banking crisis in 1996 and 1997 (Kawai and Takayasu 
(2000) and Siamwalla (2001)). Specifically, banks used deposits and short term unhedged foreign 
currency loans to lend long term loans in domestic currency. In addition, Thai banks and finance 
companies had many poor quality loan  portfolios due t o risky lending which were based  on 
collateral and connection (Krugman and Charumilind, Kali, and Wiwattanakantang (forthcoming)). 
The underlying problem that enabled these lending practices to occur was systematic failure of risk 
management systems and prudential controls. When exports, the real estate and stock markets fell 
in 1996, many financial institutions became insolvent with a huge amount of non performing loans. 
It was clear in 1996 that many finance companies and one bank, the Bangkok Bank of Commerce 
(BBC) were in financial trouble due to their exposure to real estate loans (Siamwalla (2001)). The 
failure of the Thai government in dealing with the problems in the financial sector precipitated the 
crisis in Thailand (Nukul (1998) and Flatters (1999)).   
At the same time as the banking crisis, an increasingly severe attack against the baht 
happened (Siamwalla (2001)). In response, massive capital fights began in the late 1996 until July 
2, 1997, when the country’s foreign exchange reserves exhausted. In August 1997, the government 
signed the first Letter of Intent requesting for the IMF assistance.   
The depreciation of baht and the increase in interest rates had immediate negative effects of 
the cash flow of non financial companies that had high short term unhedged foreign dominated 
loans but held long term baht dominated assets. All of these developments aggravated liquidity and 
solvency problems in  the financial industry.  As a consequence, a bout  one third of financial 
institutions became insolvent.   
 
4.2 Banking and Financial Sector Reforms 
The IMF program included 2 major components: stabilize the macro economy and restore 
financial market stability (Flatters (1999), Department of Foreign Affairs (2000), and Kawai and 
Takayasu (2000)). It dealt with measures to improve economic governance and competitiveness of 
Thai industries, developing social safety nets, and reforming and rehabilitating the financial sector 
to avoid the system collapse (Flatters (1999). To increase confidence in the banking industry, the 
government provided a blanket  guarantee for depositors.  To restore the effectiveness of  the 
financial industry and increase financial sector transparency and competition, the government   17 
strengthened prudential regulations, loan classification and capital adequacy. In 1997 and 1998, 
several emergency amendments to the Bank of Thailand, commercial banking and finance 
company laws were passed to enable the Bank of Thailand to intervene promptly with non viable 
financial institutions. 
Financial sector reforms went with bank and finance company closures and nationalization. 
In addition, in order to assist financial sector recapitalization, the government also remodeled the 
financial sector environment by increasing the foreign ownership  limit  of banks and finance 
companies  from 25% to 100% for the next ten years.  The August 1998 package of Baht 300 
million was  introduced  to  expedite financial institution recapitalization. Under this scheme, 
financial institutions that meet specified prudential conditions received public fund injections. To 
assist finance companies to write off their bad loans, the government set up the Asset Management 
Corporation. 
By the end of 2000, out of 91 finance companies as of 1996, 71 were closed down. As for 
banks, out of 14 domestic banks as of 1996, four were closed down, two were taken over by the 
government and  four banks had majority  foreign ownership (Aunichitworawong, Souma, and 
Wiwattanakantang (2003)). Most financial institutions that have survived were recapitalizing by 
obtaining direct equity investments from foreign partners and issuing shares and capital securities.   
Table 6 presents the ownership structure of banks 1996 and 2000. Interestingly, before the 
crisis the largest shareholder of 12 out of 14 Thai commercial banks that operated was either a 
single family or a group of families (see also Aunichitworawong, Souma, and Wiwattanakantang 
(2003)). The largest shareholders of seven banks were the top 30 business group families. These 
banks are namely the Bangkok Bank, Siam Commercial Bank, Bank of Ayudhya, Thai Farmers 
Bank, First Bangkok City Bank, Bangkok Metropolitan Bank, and Siam City Bank. However, after 
the crisis four families lost the control over the banks. The First Bangkok City Bank, an affiliation 
of the Siriwattanapakdi family was among the four banks that were closed down in 1998. The 
Bangkok Metropolitan Bank (of the  Techapaibul family) and  the  Siam City Bank (of the 
Srifuengfung family) were in financial distress and therefore were taken over by the state in 1998. 
The Lamsam family, the founder and the long time largest shareholder of the Thai Farmers Bank, 
could not maintain the position. The Development Bank of Singapore became the bank’s largest 
shareholder in 2000.   
In 2000, the three families that remain as the largest shareholder of Thai banks were the   18 
Sophonpanich, the Crown Property Bureau, and the Rattanarak who own the Bangkok Bank, the 
Siam Commercial Bank, and the Bank of Ayudhya, respectively. To maintain the position as the 
largest shareholder, a massive funding was raised by selling shares to other investors (most of 
which were foreign) as well as selling the groups’ non-core businesses. For example, the Rattanrak 
family sold about 25% of their shares in the Siam City Cement to Swiss investors (Kewison 
(2000)).   
 
<Table 6 here> 
 
4.3 Corporate Sector Reforms 
  To refurbish the corporate sector’s balance sheets, the government’s essential policy as 
commitments to the IMF was to facilitate corporate restructuring.  The major reforms include 
amending of bankruptcy and foreclosure laws, establishing an effective bankruptcy enforcement 
framework, developing well structured out-of-court procedure for voluntary debt restructuring, 
streamlining institutional arrangement for corporate debt work outs, and establishing an effective 
legal scheme for asset recovery through court-based bankruptcy and court-controlled debt 
restructuring or reorganization (Department of Foreign Affairs (2000), Flatters (1999), and Tarde 
Kawai and Takayasu (2000)). 
In addition, the Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee (CDRAC) was set up in 
June 1998  to  oversee and facilitates voluntary debt restructuring negotiations under a market 
oriented framework. The members of the CDRAC include both creditor (and debtor associations. 
However,  de facto  the CDRAC’s  process covers only creditors who are financial institutions 
(Kawai and Takayasu (2000) and Dasri (2001)). CDRAC and the March 1999 bankruptcy law 
amendment accelerated corporate debt restructuring. About 400,000 classified loans, totaling Baht 
2.6 trillion was restructured under the CDRAC process as of August 1999. Among them, 700 cases 
were large distressed loans that exceeded Baht 500 million. At the end of 2000, around a half of 
the cases that went through the CDRAC process, totaling Baht 1.1 trillion, completed (Bank of 
Thailand (2000)).   
In general, corporate debt restructuring was quite effective. The survey of the World Bank 
coving about 400 non financial companies shows that corporate debt ratio declined from 3.2 in 
1997 to 2.04 in the mid of 1999 (Department of Foreign Affairs (2000) and World Bank (2000)).     19 
Corporate r estructuring, however, has been financial rather than operational. Corporate 
restructuring has  generally  involved debt restructuring  negotiations with  creditors that lead to 
lower interest and principal payments or an increase in the maturity of the company’s debt, 
exchanging equity securities for debt, and offering creditors the company’s equity securities. Only 
in a small number of cases has operational restructuring been registered (United Nations Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2001)). 
Besides, the reforms to promote corporate debt restructuring, the government implemented 
reforms to improve corporate governance focusing on strengthen the board of directors, strengthen 
the  institutional framework for accounting and auditing practices, improving the  quality and 
reliability on company information, and strengthen minority shareholder rights (Department of 
Foreign Affairs (2000)). 
 
5. Business Groups after the Crisis: Extensive Restructurings 
Increased debt and reduced profitability after the East Asian financial crisis and baht 
devaluation induced Thai firms to undertake extensive restructuring actions. In this section, we 
investigate restructuring activities undertaken by  the top 30 business group firms. T he data on 
restructuring actions are collected from the company daily news database at the website of the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand, company annual reports and financial statements. 
 
5.1 Restructuring Activities of Business Groups 
Following the literature (John et al. (1992), Ofek (1993), Kang and Shivdasani (1997), Lai 
and Sudarsanam (1997), Denis and Kruse (2000), Kang et al. (2001), and Baek et al. (2002)), we 
categorize restructuring actions into operational actions and financial actions. The operational 
actions include the following three actions. First, asset downsizing is when a firm undertook the 
following activities: asset sales (e.g., financial securities, land, properties, and stakes in other 
businesses or joint ventures), plant closing, reducing of production capacities, discontinuing or 
suspending production operation, shutting down a division, office, branch, or subsidiary. We do not 
include  employee layoffs which are common restructuring because the data are not available. 
Second, expansion is when a firm undertook the following activities: engaging in joint venture or 
strategic alliance, fully or partially acquiring other businesses, diversifying into new lines of 
business, constructing new facilities, establishing  a  new division, office, branch, or subsidiary,   20 
expanding existing production facilities, and investing in existing subsidiaries. Third,  top 
management turnover is when at least one of the top management was replaced. The top 
management positions include chairman of the board, president, vice president, chief executive 
officer, managing director, and deputy managing director.   
The  financial actions include the following three actions.  First,  dividend cut is w hen 
dividends were omitted or reduced after being paid in the previous period.  Second,  debt 
restructuring is  when the following activities was undertaken: reducing required interest or 
principal payment on debt agreement, extending debt maturity, exchanging equity securities 
(common stocks or securities convertible to common stocks) for debt or giving creditors equity 
securities, and appointing a financial advisor to assist in debt restructuring process. Finally, capital 
raising is when the following debt and securities were issued: new loans, debentures, common 
stocks, and hybrid securities including preferred stocks, warrants, and convertible debentures.   
Table 7 reports the frequency of restructuring actions undertaken by the top 30 group firms 
during 1996-2000. We also provide the information for non-group firms for a comparison. In 
general, group firms appear to be more active than non groups firms in pursuing restructuring in all 
years. However, the differences are statistically significant in the year of the crisis and one 
subsequent year, at the 5% level.   
Considering firms affiliated to the top 30 business groups,   
Restructurings were taken by Thai firms even before the crisis. In 1996, about 94.95% of 
group firms and 91.50% of non group firms adopted at least one of the restructurings. Among them, 
expansionary actions were the most often implemented restructuring actions occurring in about 
83.84% and 78.95% of group firms and non group firms, respectively. Interestingly, at the onset of 
the crisis i n 1997,  we find that group firms undertook almost all types of restructurings 
significantly more often than non group firms. Dividend cuts appear to be the immediate responses 
as they were the most often implemented restructuring actions taken by all firms. About 67.68% 
and 57.98%  of group firms  and non group firms, respectively, cut dividend.  Surprisingly, 
expansionary actions, but not asset downsizing, were the second most often undertaken actions by 
both group and non group firms. While  expansionary actions  occurred in about 55.56% and 
45.14% of group firms and non group firms, respectively, downsizing actions were taken in only 
17.17% and 20.62% of group firms  and non group firms, respectively. The  third most often 
undertaken actions by both group and non group firms were capital raising  occurring in about   21 
46.46% and 31.53% of group firms and non group firms, respectively. 
During the period of 1998-2000, however,  expansionary actions were the most often 
implemented actions by group firms following by capital raising and asset downsizing actions. 
Statistically, expansionary actions were adopted by 40.21%, 44.19%, and 40.74% of group firms in 
1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively. About 46.46%, 29.9%, 43.02%, and 34.57% of the group firms 
raise capital in 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively. D ownsizing  was taken  in  about  in 
24.74%, 25.58%, and 21.16% of the group firms in 1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively. 
Among  financial restructuring, capital raising appears to be used most often  during the 
period of 1998-2000. Group firms appear to cut dividend less often in the years after the crisis. 
Only 10.31%, 9.3%, and 18.52% of the group firms adopt dividend cuts in 1998, 1999, and 2000, 
respectively. We also find that group firms slowly  restructured their debt. While there was no 
single group firm restructured the debt in 1997, about 7.2%, 8.14%, and 14.81% of  group firms 
restructured their debt in 1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively. In sum, group firms responded to the 
East Asian crisis by initially cutting dividends and then raising external capital and restructuring 
debt. 
A substantial increase in the number of firms restructuring debt since 1997  might be 
attributable to the passage of the 1998 Amendment to Bankruptcy Act (No. 4) on March 4, 1998. 
The amendment contains the legal framework designed for a court-supervised debt restructuring or 
reorganization of a company that resembles the Chapter 11 provisions of the US. The new law 
allows a distressed company to recuperate its business, while it protects the interests of company’s 
creditors (Pornavalai (1999) and Wong, Phunsunthron and Sucharikul (2000)).   
It is worth noting that the incidence of top executive turnover is substantially higher after 
the crisis hit. Specifically, the turnover rate has risen from 2.02% in 1996 to 18.18% in 1997, and 
remained exceeding 12%  for the whole sample period. This  may  imply that long  term distress 
forces firms to remove their managers. 
 
<Table 7 here> 
 
To illustrate how top business groups implement restructuring schemes groups in response 
to the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, we summarize restructuring activities undertaken by some 
of the leading business as follow.   22 
 
The Central Group (Chirathiwat Family) 
The Central group is owned by an extensive Chirathiwat family with 160 family members. 
Like other groups, the group’s leverage increased due to the baht devaluation. Its main business 
which is department store went into financial distressed. Unlike many other Thai companies, the 
Central group did not seek for foreign partners to help it restructure their companies. The group 
had closed over 120 money-losing subsidiaries and subcontracted out unspecialized operations 
such as securities and maintenance.   
  Since 1998, the Central group’s profit has soared. It had paid off all foreign-currency debt 
of  USD  80 million by 2002. The family has an aggressively plan to expand the group’s local 
department stores to double by 2009. In addition, it has been buying assets from its previous 
business partners and competitors that are still in financially distress.   
 
The Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group (Chiarawanon Family) 
The group has been led by Dhanin Chiarawanon. The CP group had been extremely 
diversified with a huge investment in China. In 1997, it was the biggest foreign investor in China 
with nearly 130 joint ventures. The CP group had the policy to keep the ownership in the hands of 
the founding family, the group companies were dependent on loans from domestic and overseas. 
Among the companies in the group, the TelecomAsia, was severely affected by the crisis. 
TelecomAsia failed to pay debt obligation of USD 1.9 billion. Accordingly, the creditor banks 
suspended the whole group’s line of credit. The TelecomeAsia had undertaken a number of 
restructure activities. It sold out the shares of its joint ventures and cutting various expenses. Most 
importantly, it restructured debt that was owed to 45 local and foreign creditors to. In 1999, some 
of the creditors agreed to forgive some of debt and extend the principal payment. In exchange, the 
TelecomAsia issued preferred shares to its largest secured creditor. 
The CP group hired the McKinsey & Company to assist with the restructuring of the whole 
group. The major activity was the mergers of the three listed companies namely the CPNE, BAP, 
and BKP with the CPF (Charoen Pokphand Foods) to become the CPF in September 1998. The 
CPF is responsible for agribusiness and wholesaling and retailing lines. After the reorganization, 
the CPF has 30 affiliated companies whose shares are held by CPF of more than 50%. The 
affiliated companies also own another 15 companies.   23 
In addition, the group sold out the money-losing businesses both in China and Thailand. In 
China, the group sold its entire stakes of the joint ventures namely the China-backed APT Satellite, 
the Shanghai brewery, and the Ek Chor Motorcycle. In Thailand, the group sold its shares in the 
Lotus convenience store chain and the KFC chain. Its cable television operation was merged with 
the Shinawatra group.   
 
The Sahapattanapibul Group (Chokwattana Family) 
Compared to other big business groups, the Sahapattanapibul group was affected relative 
less by the depreciation of the Baht as it had relatively less foreign-currency loans. However, the 
Chokwatana family, who is the founding and controlling family, has fortified their group by 
focusing on the core businesses which are consumer products and textile. Additionally, they 
replaced foreign hedge funds with long-term foreign investors.   
 
The Shinawatra Group (Shinawatra Family) 
The controlling shareholder and the founder of the Shinawatra group is Thaksin Shinawatra 
who is the current Prime Minister of Thailand. Among all largest Thai business groups, the 
Shinawatra group is thought to be affected least by the Baht devaluation in 1997 since about 70% 
of their foreign debt was hedged. It is widely thought that close connections with the Minister of 
Finance during the crisis period was contributable to this transaction, however. 
Nevertheless, the devaluation of the baht has boosted the costs of imported mobile phone 
equipment and computer supplies, the core business of the group. Given the decline in demand due 
to the crisis and intense competition, the group called for restructuring plans. Like other groups, it 
focused on the core business which is telecommunication. These companies are the Advanced Info 
Services (AIS) and the Shinawatra Satellite. Operationally, the group laid off employees, slashed 
their holdings in loss-making cable television operator, and sold out international investments to 
foreign investors. Financially, it increased its paid-up capital and issued bonds and warrants to 
repay debt and reserve for working capital. Currently, the group tried to lower the debt to equity 
ratio from 2 to 1 to 1.5 to 1.   
To obtain the management know-how and advanced technology in order to be competitive 
in the near future liberalization of the telecommunication industry, the group had a regional 
leading communication company, the Singapore Telecommunication, as its major shareholder of   24 
the AIS.   
 
The Siam Cement/Siam Commercial Bank Group (the Crown Property Bureau)   
The Siam Cement group has been among the Thailand’s largest business groups and one of 
the South East Asia’s leading business groups. Similar to other Thai business groups, before the 
crisis, they had tremendously diversified its business lines into other construction materials, 
petrochemicals, chemicals, steel, tires, power plants, paper, packaging, ceramics, machinery, 
automotive parts, and trading. The investment was financed by offshore loans that had about 5-6% 
lower than domestic loans. With the outstanding debt of USD 6.6 billion in 1997, mostly in foreign 
currency and unhedged, the Siam Cement group was one among the Asia’s companies that were hit 
hardest by the regional economic crisis.   
Like the CP group, the Siam Cement group hired the McKinsey & Company to assist with 
restructuring. The restructuring plans are as follow. First, the group focused its lines of business on 
the core businesses namely cement, petrochemicals, steel, ceramics, chemicals and pulp and paper. 
Other lines of business vehicles and parts, electronic products, and property development were to 
be sold out. After the crisis, the Siam Cement group had liquidated its shares in almost 60 
affiliations (see also Suehiro 2002)).   
Second, the group has altered their debt structure by replacing some short- to medium-term 
loans with long-term loans, and issuing local bonds to refinance overseas borrowings. By 2001, the 
Siam Cement group had decreased their foreign-currency loans from $4.5 billion to zero. It also 
planned to raise new equity to lower its high level of leverage. Third, the group tried to reduce the 
number of employees  mainly in the  construction material business by introducing a voluntary 
retirement program. So far, the number of staffs was reduced from 35,000 to 25,000.   
 
The Thai Farmers Bank Group (Lamsam Family) 
Massive restructuring was adopted in many major companies in the group, in particular the 
Thai Farmers Bank group. To assist the restructuring plan, the bank led by Banthoon Lamsam, 
hired foreign consulting firms whose three employees were appointed to the board. To restructure 
its capitals, the Lamsam family reduced the family’s shareholdings from 17% to 6%. From 1998, 
the bank has raised more than Baht 1,000 billion from the capital market, and sold 49% of its 
assets to overseas investors. Consequently, the bank could write off non-performing loans one year   25 
earlier than the deadline set by the Bank of Thailand. 
The bank has also adopted new technology such as electronic and internet banking and 
automatic bills payment. It also trained the employees to become service oriented. Those who were 
not able to keep up with new technology were encouraged to retire via an early-retirement 
campaign. The bank had spent around Baht 1.7 billion to reduce the number of employees by 20%. 
In addition, it also introduced the performance based evaluation system. 
 
5.2 The effects of restructurings 
In this section, we investigate the results of the restructuring actions implemented by 
business groups  described  in Section 5.1. We compare performance before and after the 
restructuring actions were taken. Performance is measured by the ratio of EBIT to total assets. To 
control for the industry effects, we also compute industry-adjusted changes in  the  operating 
performance from the year  in which firms restructure to the two subsequent years. The 
industry-adjusted change in operating performance is calculated as a change in the ratio of EBIT to 
total assets for a sample firm minus a median change in the ratio of EBIT to total assets for its 
industry.   
We calculate  mean and median changes in the operating performance from Year 0 (in 
which a restructuring is undertaken) to two years following Year 0 (denoted by Year 1 and Year 2, 
respectively).  The results shown  in Table 8  indicates that restructurings appear to work well 
because  operating performance improves after  restructurings were implemented.  When the 
performance measure is not controlled for the industry effects (unadjusted changes in operating 
performance), debt restructuring has the most pronounced favorable effect. Specifically, firms that 
restructure debt in Year 0 exhibit significantly positive mean and median changes in the ratio of 
EBIT to assets from Year 1 to Year 2 and from Year 0 to Year 2. When the industry effects are 
controlled, group firms have significantly positive changes in operating performance for the first 
and second year subsequent to restructuring undertakings. Overall, the mean (median) value of 
industry-adjusted changes in the ratio of EBIT to total assets from Year 0 to Year 1 is 2.51% 
(1.68%). This value is significant at the 1% level.   
Consistent with the general results, except for dividend cuts and debt restructuring, group 
firms that have adopted other types of restructurings show a positive and significant  adjusted 
performance change in one year following the restructuring.  We also find that except asset   26 
downsizing and debt restructuring, industry adjusted performance of firms that adopted other types 
of restructurings significantly increase in two years following the restructurings.   
 
<Table 8 here> 
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper investigates the top 30 business groups in Thailand in three following aspects: 
the formation of the groups, the characteristics before the financial crisis, and the effects of the 
crisis and their responses. Business groups in Thailand emerged around the end of 1940s until the 
1950s concentrating on the Chinese immigrants who brought with them trading skills. We argue 
that political connections and foreign capital and technology are contributable to the emerging of 
business groups.  While political connections  provided influential families  with  a number of 
privileges in terms of investment opportunities and funding, an access to foreign capital brought 
them not only funding but also know-how of which they lacked. So, during the 1960s until the end 
of the 1980s, business groups that owned banks grew faster than other groups mainly because they 
controlled financial sources. However, owning financial institutions became less crucial for 
business success after the financial deregulation beginning around the end of the 1980s, and the 
development of the Stock Exchange of Thailand and the BIBF. Accordingly, business groups that 
do not own banks had the opportunities to grow rapidly.   
We constructed a unique ownership and control database focusing on non-financial firms 
listed  on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. We find that similar to  business groups in many 
emerging economies, the ownership and control of Thai business groups are concentrated in the 
hands of the founding family. The mean value of voting rights held by the largest shareholder is 
42.90%, 44.1%, and 46.28% in 1995, 1996, and 1997, respectively. Interestingly, the ownership 
and governance structure of the group firms (excluding banks or financial companies) did not 
change significantly after the crisis. In contrast, almost all business groups that used to own banks 
turned out to lose the control due to insolvency. Their banks and finance companies were eithier 
closed down or took over by the government and foreign financial institutions.   
After the crisis, due to the depreciation of the Baht in July 1997, the debt ratio for business 
group firms has gone up from 40% in 1996 to 54% by the end of 1997. At the same time, their   27 
profits have decreased significantly. After taking account of interest expenses, on average business 
group firms have been in red after the crisis. Massive restructuring measures have been adopted. 
These restructurings include  asset downsizing, some sort of  expansion, turnover in t op 
management,  dividend cut,  debt restructuring, and  capital raising. Even though  restructurings 
appear to work in that overall industry-adjusted performance has been improved, still the business 
group firms, on average, have not been profitable by the end of the 1990s. Specifically, the mean 
ratio of EBIT to total assets for the top 30 business groups are -1.56% in 1997, -3.17% in 1998, 
-5.49% in 1999. The profit has, on average, increased in 2000 to -2.1%, however. 
The East Asian financial crisis has had significant adverse effects on  Thailand.  On a 
positive side, the government undertook various effective legal measures to remodel the country’s 
institutional environment.  These suggest that big business groups are entering the new era of 
business. Many of them have lost their financial bases, and hence would probably not be able to 
obtain funding easily as it used to be in the past when they owned banks and financial institutions. 
To be able to obtain external funding from capital markets, business groups need to improve their 
corporate governance and be more transparent.     28 
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Table1: The Top 30 Business Groups in Thailand   
 
Panel A presents the ranking of business groups. The raking in 1979 is taken from Suehiro (1989). The rankings in 
1984. 1994, and 1997 are taken from Suehiro (2000). The 1979 and 1984 ranking are based on total sales of companies 
in the same group. The ranking of 1994 and 1997 are based on total sales of group affiliations that appear among the 
top 1,000 companies in Thailand that were ranked based on sales. Panel B presents the owner family names of each 
top 30 business group in 1994, and the business lines and the number of affiliated firms in the group which are taken 
from Johnstone et al. (2001). 
 
Panel A: The rankings 
 
  1979  1984  1994  1997 
Ranking  Group name  Group name  Group name  Group name 
         
1 
Siam Cement (Siam 
Commercial Bank)  Bangkok Bank 
Siam Cement (Siam 
Commercial Bank) 
Siam Cement (Siam 
Commercial Bank) 
2  Bangkok Bank 
Siam Cement (Siam 
Commercial Bank) 
Bangkok Bank  Bangkok Bank 
3  Chawkwanyu  CP  CP  CP 
4  Siam Motors    Metro  Thai Farmers Bank  TCC 





Bank  Boon Rawd Brewery  Boon Rawd Brewery 
7  Thai Farmers Bank    Siam Motors    TCC  Bank of Ayudhya 
8  Metro  Soon Hua Seng  Sahapattanapibul  TPI 
9  Boon Rawd Brewery  Sahapattanapibul  Thonburi Phanich  Siam Motors   
10  Chaiyaporn Rice  Saha-Union  Sittipol  Central 
11  Sahapattanapibul  Boon Rawd Brewery  Bank of Ayudhya    Sahapattanapibul 
12  Sukree  Hong Yih Seng  Metro  Ital-Thai 
13  Laemthong  Sukree  Osotsapa  Metro 
14  TPI  Siew  Cathay  MMC Sithipol 
15  Bank of Ayudhya    Cathay  Central  Srifuengfung 
16  Kamol Sukosol  Central  TPI  Taechaphaibun 
17  Thai Rung Ruang  Laemthong  Ital-Thai  Saha-Union 
18  Sittipol  Thai Rung Ruang  Saha-Union  Osotsapa 
19  U Chu Liang  Kwang Soon Lee 
Bangkok Metropolitan 
Bank  Sahaviriya 
20  Kwang Soon Lee  Osothsapha  Shinnawatra  Shinnawatra 
21  Soon Hua Seng  Yip In Tsoi  Sahaviriya  Thonburi Phanich 
22  Ital-Thai  Mitr-Pol  Siam Steel Pipe  Soon Hua Seng 
23  Saha-Union  Nanaphan  SP International  UCOM 
24  Central  Sentagro  Soon Hua Seng  TPC 
25  Cathay  Unicord  Land and House  Thai Union 
26  Siew  Mah Boonkrong  Yip In Tsoi  Land and House 
27  PSA  Wangkanai  Thai Life Insurance  Siam Steel Pipe 
28  Wang Lee  Kamol Kij  Thai Summit  Thai Summit 
29  Bangkok Rice  teck Bee Han  Bangkok Land  Betagro 
30  Osothsapha  Kamol Sukosol  Thai Union  Mitr Phol 
         Panel B: Business Lines 
 
Ranking 
in 1994  
Group name  Owner family name  Industries  No. of 
firms 
         
1 
Siam Cement/Siam 
Commercial Bank  
Crown Property 
Bureau  
Manufacturing; banking, finance and insurance; hotels, real estate development and 
construction; media/communication/advertising  29 
2  Bangkok Bank  Sophonpanich 
Finance and insurance; agri-industry and warehousing; health care services; real estate 
development; holding companies  46 
3  CP  Chiarawanon 
Agro-industry; aquaculture; chemicals; international trading; marketing and services; real 







Banking, finance and insurance; trading; telecommunications/computers/media and 
advertising; manufacturing; hotels, real estate development and construction 
43 
5  Siam Motors  Pornprapha 
Trading; recreation, transport and services; real estate development and construction; 
automotive industry/manufacturing; distribution; information technology/services  63 
6  Boon Rawd   Piromphakdi 
Liquor distilling and distribution; manufacturing; real estate and property development; 
holding companies  12 
7 
TCC/First Bangkok City 
Bank 
Siriwattanapakdi  Liquor distilling and distribution; holding companies; banking, finance and insurance  60 
8  Sahapattanapibul  Chokwattana 
Consumer products; textile and garments; cosmetics and toiletries; footwear and rubber 
products; food processing and distribution; office equipment; machinery and electrical 
equipment; plastics products; advertising and design; property development; holding 
companies; finance   
194 
9  Thonburi Phanich  Wiriyaphan  Automotive; real estate development; tourism and transport; publishing  9 
10  MMC Sittipol  Lee-issaranukun  Automotive; manufacturing  7 
11  Bank of Ayudhya    Ratanarak  Banking, finance and insurance; manufacturing  25 
12  Metro  Laohathai 
Agro-chemicals; metals; agriculture and food industry; plastics; industrial chemicals; real 




Holdings  Osathanukhro 
Manufacturing and distribution; real estate development and construction; trading; finance 
and insurance  97 
14  Cathay/Thai-Asahi  Srifuengfung 
Financial services; manufacturing; mining; marketing; shipping and transport; hotels, real 
estate development and construction  111 
15  Central  Chirathiwat 
Retailing;  manufacturing; hotels, real estate development and construction; trading and 
distribution; finance and insurance 
69 
           34 
 
Panel B (continued) 
 
Ranking   Group name  Owner family name  Industries  No. of 
firms 
         
16  TPI/Hong Yiah Seng  Liaophairat 
Petrochemical industry/oil retailing/energy; finance and insurance; agro-industry and 
agricultural trading; textile  
22 
17  Ital-Thai  Kannasut 
Construction; trading; manufacturing; hotels, travel and real estate development; food and 
beverages; telecommunications  37 
18  Saha-Union  Darakanon  Manufacturing; distribution; real estate development; power generation  78 
19 
Bangkok Metropolitan 
Bank  Taechaphaibun 
Banking and finance; hotels, real estate development and construction; transport; liquor 
distilling and distribution; manufacturing; holding companies  81 
20  Shinnawatra  Shinnawatra  Computer and telecommunication; broadcasting  26 
21  Sahaviriya  Wiriyaphraphaikit  Agriculture; computer and telecommunications; finance; steel manufacturing  58 
22 
Siam Steel Pipe/Siam 
Syntech 
Leesawattrakun  Steel trading and manufacturing; construction/building systems; real estate development  35 
23  SP International    Phornprapha  Automotive, assembly and distribution  11 
24 
Soon Hua Seng/Kaset 
Rung Ruang 
Damnoencharnwanit 
Import and export of agricultural products; agricultural milling; paper and pulp; cold 
storage and warehousing 
23 
25 
Land and House/Quality 
House  Assawaphokhin  Hotels, real estate development and construction  26 
26  Yip In Tsoi/Finance One  Yip In Tsoi, Chutrakul  Trading; finance and insurance; real estate development; manufacturing  24 
27  Thai Life Insurance  Chaiyawan  Finance and insurance; real estate development  23 
28  Thai Summit  Jungrungruenkit  Automotive; hotels and real estate development; finance and securities  28 
29  Tanayong  Kanchanapat 
Real estate, hotels and property management; finance; retail outlets and restaurants; 
holding companies  34 
30  Thai Union  Charnsiri  n/a  13 
         
 Table 2: The number of listed firms affiliated with the top 30 business groups and their 
market capitalization 
 
Panel A presents the number of non-financial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand between 1995 and 2000 
in which the largest shareholder is one of the families who own the top 30 business groups. Pane B presents the “share 
of group-firm market capitalization” which is calculated as the percentage of market capitalization by group firms to 
total market capitalization.   
 
Panel A: Number of Non-Financial Listed Firms 
 


















               
1  Siam Cement/Siam Commercial Bank   5  6  7  7  6  6 
2  Bangkok Bank  2  3  3  3  3  4 
3  CP  6  6  6  7  4  4 
4  Thai Farmers Bank/Loxley  4  3  4  4  4  3 
5  Siam Motors  0  0  0  0  0  0 
6  Boon Rawd   0  0  0  0  0  0 
7  TCC/First bangkok City Bank  1  1  1  1  1  1 
8  Sahapattanapibul  18  19  19  19  19  19 
9  Thonburi Phanich  0  0  0  0  0  0 
10  MMC Sittipol  2  2  1  1  1  1 
11  Bank of Ayudhya    3  3  3  3  0  0 
12  Metro  3  4  4  4  4  3 
13  Osotsapa/Premier/GF Holdings  10  9  8  7  6  6 
14  Cathay/Thai-Asahi  3  3  2  3  2  2 
15  Central  4  6  6  6  6  5 
16  TPI/Hong Yiah Seng  2  2  2  2  3  3 
17  Ital-Thai  2  2  2  2  2  2 
18  Saha-Union  5  5  5  5  5  5 
19  Bangkok Metropolitan Bank  0  0  0  0  0  0 
20  Shinnawatra  3  3  4  3  3  3 
21  Sahaviriya  2  2  2  2  2  1 
22  Siam Steel Pipe/Siam Syntech  2  2  1  1  1  1 
23  SP International    0  1  1  1  1  1 
24  Soon Hua Seng/Kaset Rung Ruang  1  1  1  1  1  1 
25  Land and House/Quality House  3  4  4  4  4  4 
26  Yip In Tsoi/Finance One  8  9  10  9  7  5 
27  Thai Life Insurance  0  0  0  0  0  0 
28  Thai Summit  0  0  0  0  0  0 
29  Tanayong  2  2  2  2  1  1 
30  Thai Union  1  2  2  1  1  1 
 
Average number of firms per group  3.07  3.33  3.33  3.27  2.90  2.73 
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Panel B: Market Capitalization 
 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
             
Market capitalization by group 
firms (billion baht)  1,062.97  657.10  260.14  338.75  680.96  360.88 
Total market capitalization  
(billion baht)  3,564.57  2,559.58  1,133.34  1,268.20  2,193.07  1,279.22 
Share of group-firm market 
capitalization (%)  29.82  25.67  22.95  26.71  31.05  28.21 
             
Number of firms  92  100  100  98  87  82 
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Table 3: Family Relationship between Business Groups 
 
This table presents the relationship that is tied via marriage between families who own the top 30 business groups. 
Note that we only trace the families who are shareholders of our sample firms, hence it may not include all the 
related families. 
 
Ranking  Owner family name  Related families 
     
1  Crown Property Bureau   - 
2  Sophonpanich  Ramayarupa, Srifuengfung 
3  Chiarawanon  - 
4  Lamsam  Chatikavanij, Mokkawes, Chutrakul 
5  Pornprapha  - 
6  Piromphakdi  - 
7  Siriwattanapakdi  - 
8  Chokwattana  Dhanasarnsilp, Pavalolanvittaya, Kriangpratana, Srirojanant, Punsak-udomsin 
9  Wiriyaphan  - 
10  Lee-issaranukun  Phannachet, Pisitkasem 
11  Ratanarak  - 
12  Laohathai  - 
13  Osathanukhro  Phongsathorn, Prajuabmoh, Piya-oui, Thienprasidda 
14  Srifuengfung  Panijcheeva, Sophonpanich 
15  Chirathiwat  Boonyarat, Mongkolkiti, Eurwattanasakul 
16  Liaophairat  - 
17  Kannasut  Charanachitta, Rengpittaya, Terdprawat 
18  Darakanon  - 
19  Taechaphaibun  - 
20  Shinnawatra  Damapong 
21  Wiriyaphraphaikit  Intanate 
22  Leesawattrakun  Boonnamsap 
23  Phornprapa  Narongdej 
24  Damnoencharnwanit  - 
25  Assawaphokhin  Harnpanich 
26  Yip In Tsoi, Chutrakul 
Chakkaphak, Chatikavanij, Srivikorn, Buranasiri, Sribunruang, Thavisin, 
Lamsam 
27  Chaiyawan  - 
28  Jungrungruengkit  - 
29  Kanchanapat  - 
30  Charnsiri  Chan, Tangchansiri 
     
 Table 4: Governance Characteristics  
 
This table presents mean values of the governance variables of sample firms. The sample includes non-financial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
between 1995 and 2000. “Group firms” refer to firms in which the largest shareholder is one of families who own the top 30 business groups. “Non group firms” 
refer to firms in which the largest shareholder is not among families who own the top 30 business groups. ***, **, and * indicate that means are significantly 
different between group firms and non-group firms at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using heteroskedastic t-tests.   
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Number of firms  92  208  100  246  100  256  98  247  87  241  82  237 
                         Table 5: Financial Characteristics 
 
This table presents mean values of the financial variables of sample firms. The sample includes non-financial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
between 1995 and 2000. All data are obtained from the I-SIMS database. Total capital is the sum of total debt and market value of equity. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of 
the sum of total liabilities and market value of equity to book value of total assets. “Group firms” refer to firms in which the largest shareholder is one of families 
who own the top 30 business groups. “Non group firms” refer to firms in which the largest shareholder is not among families who own the top 30 business groups. 
***, **, and * indicate that means are significantly different between group firms  and non-group firms at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using 
heteroskedastic t-tests. 
 



































































































































































































































































































                         
Number of firms  92  208  100  246  100  256  98  247  87  241  82  237 
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Table 6: Ownership of Commercial Banks in 1996 and 2000 
 
This table presents the name of the founders and the largest shareholders of all Thai commercial banks in 1996 and 2000. The information on the largest shareholders 
is obtained from Anuchitworawong, Souma, and Wiwattanakantang (2003). 
 
 
    Largest shareholders   
Commercial banks as of 1996 
Founding 
Year    Founders  1996  2000  Commercial banks as of 2000 
           
Bank of Ayudhya  1945  Panomyong and  Luprasert  Ratanarak   Ratanarak   Bank of Ayudhya 
           
Bangkok Bank  1944  Leelanuch and Sophonpanich   Sophonpanich  Sophonpanich   Bangkok Bank 
           
Bangkok Bank of Commerce  1944  Pinitchonkadee and Intaratoot   Tantipipatpong   Closed down in 1998  Krungthai Bank 
           
Bangkok Metropolitan Bank  1950 
Euawattanasakul, Srifuengfung, 
Techapaibul, and Setthapakdee   
Techapaibul, 
 Siriwattanapakdee    State (intervened in 1998) 
Bangkok Metropolitan Bank 
(HSBC) 
           
Bank of Asia  1939 
University of Moral Science 
 and Politics   Phatraprasith  ABN Amro Holding   Bank of Asia 
           
Bank Thai  1998  State  -  State  Bank Thai 
           
First Bangkok City Bank  1955  Tan Keng Kun  Siriwattanapakdee  Closed down in 1998  Krungthai Bank 
           
Krungthai Bank  1966  State  State  State  Krungthai Bank 
           
Laem Thong Bank  1948  Nanthapiwat   Chansrichawala   Closed down in 1998    UOB Radanasin Bank 
           
Nakornthon Bank  1933  Wang Lee    Wang Lee    Standard Chartered Bank   
Standard Chartered 
Nakornthon Bank 
           
Siam Commercial Bank  1906  Crown Property Bureau  Crown Property Bureau  Crown Property Bureau  Siam Commercial Bank 
           
Siam City Bank  1941  Nirandorn  
Srifuengfung and 
Mahadamrongkul  
State (intervened in 1998)  Siam City Bank 
           
UOB Ratanasin Bank  1998  State  -  United Overseas Bank   UOB Ratanasin Bank 
           
Thai Dhanu Bank  1949  Thaveesin   Tuchinda and Rasanon   DBS Bank    DBS Thai Dhanu Bank 
           
Thai Farmers Bank  1945  Lamsam    Lamsam   
Government of Singapore 
International Corporation  Thai Farmers Bank 
           
Thai Military Bank  1957    Army, Navy, Airforce    Army, Navy, Airforce   Army, Navy, Airforce   Thai Military Bank 
           
Union Bank of Bangkok  1949  Mahakun and Visutthipol    Cholvijarn   Closed down in 1998 
Bank Thai 
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  Table 7: Restructuring Activities during 1996-2000 
 
This table presents the frequency of restructuring activities taken by sample firms.  The sample includes non-financial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) between 1997 and 2000. Figures in “Group firms” columns are the percentage of the number of firms undertaking a certain restructuring action to 
the number of total group firms. “Group firms” refer to firms in which the largest shareholder is one of families who own the top 30 business groups. “Non group 
firms” refer to firms in which the largest shareholder is not among families who own the top 30 business groups. Figures in “Non group firms” columns are the 
ratio of the number of firms undertaking a certain restructuring action to the number of total non group firms. The “p-value” columns report p-values of the test of 
difference in the proportion of firms undertaking restructuring actions between two group firms and non group firms.   
 

































                               
Any restructuring actions 94.95  91.50  0.23  92.93  85.55  0.03  72.16  59.76  0.03  75.58  66.53  0.11  74.07  66.39  0.19 
                               
Any operational actions  84.85  82.59  0.60  65.66  54.30  0.05  52.58  42.28  0.09  58.14  43.39  0.01  58.02  48.32  0.13 
  Asset downsizing  18.18  23.89  0.23  17.17  20.62  0.45  24.74  18.29  0.20  25.58  21.90  0.50  27.16  21.85  0.35 
  Expansion  83.84  78.95  0.28  55.56  45.14  0.08  40.21  28.86  0.05  44.19  26.86  0.01  40.74  30.25  0.10 
  Management turnover  2.02  4.45  0.21  18.18  5.06  0.00  12.37  9.35  0.43  15.12  12.40  0.54  16.05  12.61  0.46 
                               
Any financial actions  72.73  56.68  0.00  80.81  70.82  0.04  42.27  36.99  0.37  51.16  43.39  0.22  46.91  43.70  0.62 
  Dividend cut  51.52  39.68  0.05  67.68  57.98  0.09  10.31  14.23  0.31  9.30  9.92  0.87  18.52  13.03  0.26 
  Debt restructuring  0.00  2.02  0.03  0.00  3.50  0.00  7.22  8.94  0.59  8.14  12.40  0.24  14.81  17.65  0.55 
  Capital raising  47.47  33.60  0.02  46.46  31.52  0.01  29.90  21.14  0.10  43.02  27.27  0.01  34.57  30.25  0.48 
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Table 8: Operating Performance following Restructuring Activities  
The table presents changes in (industry-adjusted) operating performance following restructuring activities taken by 
business group firms. The sample consists of non-financial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 
between 1996 and 2000 in which the largest shareholder is one of families who own the top 30 business groups. 
Change in EBIT/total assets is calculated as the ratio of EBIT to total assets for the current year minus the same ratio 
for the previous year. Industry-adjusted change in EBIT/total assets is calculated as change in EBIT/total assets is 
calculated as the ratio of EBIT to total assets for a sample firm minus median change in EBIT/total assets for its 
industry. Year 0 denotes the year in which restructuring actions are taken. Medians are reported in brackets below the 
means. ***, **, and * indicate that means (medians) are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively, using t-tests (Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests).   
 
 
Change in EBIT/Total assets 
Industry-adjusted change   
in EBIT/Total assets 
Type of actions  Year (0, 1)  Year (1, 2)  Year (0, 2)  Year (0, 1)  Year (1, 2)  Year (0, 2) 
             
0.14  0.65  0.80  2.51***  0.93  0.99  Any restructuring 
actions (n = 365)  [-0.33]  [0.82]  [0.96]  [1.68]***  [0.19]  [0.44]** 
             
0.24  0.57  0.81  2.66***  0.70  1.02  Any operational 
actions (n = 283)  [-0.47]  [0.93]  [0.76]  [1.50]***  [0.14]  [0.50]** 
             
1.21  1.03  2.23  4.17**  0.85  2.12  Asset downsizing  
(n = 96)  [-0.55]  [1.43]  [1.90]  [2.11]***  [0.22]  [0.55] 
             
-0.57  0.33  -0.24  1.85**  0.38  0.19  Expansion 
(n = 238)  [-0.87]  [0.98]  [0.54]  [1.13]***  [0.21]  [0.55]* 
             
2.13  0.39  2.52*  4.38***  1.67  2.74**  Management 
turnover (n = 54)  [1.38]  [-0.05]  [1.41]  [2.70]**  [0.02]  [0.45] 
             
0.46  0.79  1.24  2.48***  1.42  1.59  Any financial 
actions (n = 267)  [-0.23]  [0.77]  [1.41]**  [1.80]***  [0.25]*  [1.09]*** 
             
0.75  -1.47  -0.72  1.06  0.57  0.61  Dividend cut 
(n = 145)  [-0.05]  [-0.79]  [0.56]  [0.00]  [0.14]  [1.15]** 
             
0.38  10.73***  11.11*  3.49  8.57**  7.95  Debt restructuring 
(n = 25)  [-3.94]  [5.72]***  [3.89]**  [-0.36]  [2.52]**  [2.11] 
             
1.65  0.24  1.89  4.32***  0.71  2.12  Capital raising  
(n = 180)  [0.21]  [1.04]  [2.09]**  [3.43]***  [0.43]  [1.40]*** 
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Figure 1: The Ownership Structure of International Cosmetics 
 
Source: Wiwattanakantang (2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 